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Rethinking Security at the crossroad of International 
Relations and Criminology 
 
Abstract: This article aims to introduce an in-depth conversation between International 
Relations (IR) and criminology about security practices and security studies. Too often 
each discipline has ignored the possibility of a dialogue, or has just borrowed ideas from 
the other discipline, unreflexively. This has created even more difficulties. But, it is 
possible to decolonise the topic of security from these traditional approaches, by 
connecting critical approaches on both side as they share an episteme based on an 
understanding of the practices of (in)security and the experiences lived by human 
beings. This is particularly the case of the convergence between the PARIS school of 
liberty and security analysing (in)security practices and critical criminologists 
interested in “everyday practices of security”, once they realise on both side that the 
internal and external security dimensions they study, are neither two different 
phenomena, nor the very same one, fusional and globalised at the same moment, but a 
set of differentiated practices that are nevertheless connected along a Mobius strip. 
 
 
Keywords: security-insecurity-critique-international relations- international political 
sociology- speech act- Paris school- Mobius strip- experience- practice 
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Shaking disciplinary walls, analysing (in)security as a Mobius 
strip  
 
For many years International Relations and Criminology were seen as two very different 
domains of knowledge dealing with different phenomena, war and external security or 
crime and internal security. Nowadays some people consider that they can fuse together 
without any problems because war and crime have now merged into global crime and 
terrorist jihad as a form of global civil war. Both conceptions are wrong. What we need is 
neither a wall between disciplines or their fusion into one meta-narrative but their 
articulation and a reflexive statement about their objects and conditions of production of 
knowledge. This is what an International Political Sociology focusing on sociology and 
anthropology of practices of the everyday, i.e. the Paris School, is arguing and this is also 
what a contemporary criminology represented in the UK, Canada and Belgium whose 
background is Foucauldian and whose focus is lived experiences, is claiming too. The 
shaking of the disciplinary walls is therefore necessary, but cannot be built on the illusion 
of the pure eradication of disciplines in humanities. A no-border social science for a no-
border world led only to various colonising moves from each local discipline. IR and 
criminology have therefore the tendency to pretend to have the aleph of the Borges ‘novel, 
a specific local point permitting nevertheless to have access to a full view of the global and 
to entertain from there a universal and complete point of view (Borges 1977). 
Decolonising research from both disciplines supposes therefore to realise that their 
framing of the world is partial and is very often in homology of positions with the 
institutional interests and values of the actors they analyse; IR reproducing largely the 
doxa of military, intelligence services and foreign affairs while criminologists see the 
world along the frames constructed and projected by police organisations and justice, 
even when they discuss critically their policies (Bigo 1994). Hence the convergence 
towards IR and criminology is neither a purely autonomous phenomenon of knowledge 
nor the result of a merging of war and crime, but the mediation of this “convergence” by 
different academics in their own field of research of social sciences where the struggles 
and competitions as well as the common sense resulting from the actors competing 
around the definition, grammar and pragmatic of security and insecurity are translated 
into competition, distinction and fame around the forms of knowledge which are the most 
“useful” to tackle violence and to explain security. At the roots of the misunderstanding of 
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the initial mutual ignorance of the two disciplines and the current entrepreneurial 
expertise that tries to fuse them, is therefore their own “unawareness”; unawareness or 
voluntary misrecognition that they try to project on the “world” itself as if this process of 
convergence between war and crime, inside and outside, police and military forces was 
emerging spontaneously from an objective change of delineation of what is security, 
protection, resilience and what is insecurity, violence and freedom; the process of 
veridiction (of truth-claim) is therefore described by these social scientists as if academics 
were seeing the world neutrally and “objectively” (Foucault et al. 1991). Refusing the 
dualist reality created by IR and criminology, as well as the illusion of objective borders 
given by the world as it is, while refusing the reverse idea of a boundary-less form of world 
and knowledge allows for a difficult renewal of a mature dialogue, which is sometimes of 
course irritating, between specific segments of each discipline. But it creates the 
opportunity to understand the internal politics of each academic position and the fact that 
these recognitions of the academic’s own struggles have the investigative power to 
produce more positively a transversal knowledge specifying the moment and conditions 
of possibilities of the articulation of military and police practices with the definitions of 
(in)security. The reflexivity on the relations of power and knowledge between the fields 
of social sciences and security professionals is therefore central. This is in my view the 
way to understand  for what reason the actors partakes inside from outside, police from 
military,  crime from war not as an objective factor, but as the product of a boundary-
making which can be understood as an intersubjective dispute, not around the existence 
of a differential border itself, but as a controversy about where inside and outside are 
located in a specific configuration, a little bit like in the topology of a Mobius strip where 
a surface has only one side but has a border (see figure and conclusion).  
 
This way to conceptualise the relations between IR and criminology, war and crime, 
military and police contends that the militarisation of policing led to a subordination of 
police to a military strategic context, or that an international policing has transformed and 
humanised war. Both are partial and incorrect statements that reveal first and foremost 
the status of the researcher and its discipline of origin. More importantly a proper 
reflexive analysis of the connection and involution has to undermine the traditional 
boundaries of policing and military forces and the use of metaphors regarding a merging 
of war and crime, to explain instead the rise of status of intelligence services and 
 page 4 2017-03-20 
 4 
technologies of surveillance that transform the field of practices of (in)security and the 
forms of knowledge mobilised to frame it.  
 
The “detour” by the history of each discipline regarding the other one is therefore not 
really a detour but the pre-condition for a reflexive understanding of both the regime of 
justification of the actors when they compete around the definitions of security, with the  
way in which they translate it into the academic domains and enact other forms of 
struggles, perhaps more palatable and less dangerous but often nonetheless ferocious 
when some experts try to invade the territory of others.  Between IR and criminology, it 
can be said that the relations have evolved from a mutual ignorance and an absolute 
distinction with a pretence of superiority of IR into the emergence of experts that have 
tried to place themselves as intermediaries between the discipline by strategizing the 
everyday and by inventing a geopolitical reasoning applied to any individual moving on 
earth, creating first a series of prejudice against these people, constructing stereotypes, 
and creating terminologies that evoke a fusion, an indistinction between crime and war, 
and justifying by return their own position. But, as we will see in a second part, from the 
margins of each discipline, critical scholars have deconstructed these positions, especially 
when they have focused on lived experiences of the victims of the process of 
(in)securitisation. 
Security Studies inside International Relations: a tradition of 
monopolising security as international security.  
 
It is necessary to remind ourselves that the disciplines we are speaking of are far 
from stabilised and are often under strong difficulties to be recognised as such by more 
stabilised form of knowledge and more established disciplines. International Relations is 
quite new in terms of discipline and is very often considered not as a discipline but as a 
sub field of political sciences emerging from a US approach of rational choice theory. 
However, International Relations has always been very ambitious and has set up an 
understanding of the world where IR specialists have at the same moment a qualified 
objective domain of investigation different from sociology and governmental studies, but 
one which is also nonetheless superior because of the higher level of understanding and 
reach with an international point of view capable of subsuming the trends even if details 
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may disappear, i.e. individual lived experiences. International Relations has therefore 
been conceived as dealing with states and an international system of states, but not really 
with individuals. David Singer insisted on the different levels of analysis to push IR to 
concentrate on the first two levels (Singer 1961). For him, only a macro perspective based 
on indicators and correlates could understand war and security as a major phenomenon, 
a systemic one. Individual experiences of death, violence, insecurity were not relevant. He 
succeeded with this idea of levels to empower IR and to convince his colleagues that IR 
possessed a specific domain with a specific method. The interest for criminology was 
equivalent to null, especially when, at the same moment, criminological studies were 
defining themselves as a sub field of legal and penal studies or as a psychological 
understandings of crime, analysing mainly criminal behaviour related to specific 
individuals. The question of security as “fear of crime” was therefore centrally a national 
question of law and order, implying criminal justice and policing, but very rarely 
international relations. Criminology was fighting to be accepted against other important 
disciplines: law, anthropology, sociology of policing, and was not succeeding very well in 
many places. So, it was only in the seventies and through a painful break with the past of 
the forties and the socio biology of the sixties that criminology built a different form of 
legitimacy organised along managerial logics, risk approaches, and future oriented 
strategies of prevention- prediction (Bigo and Bonelli 2015). Marginally, certainly, some 
topics were discussed from the fifties to the seventies between the two disciplines 
regarding charismatic leaders becoming tyrants and criminals, about the profiles of war 
criminalsand about piracy and mafia (Schafer 1971, Kelly 1972, Homer and Caputo 1974). 
But, at that time, it was more the specialists of international criminal law which were 
playing with the boundaries of international and internal security, than the criminologists 
themselves (Verdross 1966, Dubner 1980, Ferencz 1980, Lemkin 1947). 
Throughout this entire period, in International Relations, security was about 
“survival” and was about strategic studies. It was the time of a splendid isolation and the 
belief to be the only discipline dealing with security, to the point that they invented 
security studies as a sub field of International Relations and called it strategic studies. 
They did not think it was important to distinguish international security studies from 
other (internal) security studies. They considered that they had a monopoly. Security was 
not about individual death, or even the destruction of some places. It was about the 
destruction of a collectivity: the (nation) state by another (nation) state.  
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Turmoil, demonstrations, even civil wars were not at the heart of the discussion, 
they were peripheral and became important only when they were instruments of major 
powers. Despite all the controversies that have emerged, the current geopolitics of crime 
and terror continue to rely on this so-called superiority of IR coming from the fifties, and 
maintain or even reinforce the idea of “survival”;  now seen more as survival of 
civilisation, of values and of freedom than a state centric vision, but the continuity is still 
in a belief that a geopolitics allied with a criminology assessing the causes of crime 
permits to “societalise” the interstate vision, and to answer  the questions of global jihad 
as though it were a global crime (Kirshner 2013, Dalgaard-Nielsen and Hamilton 2006, 
Rongved 2008). Researchers on the development of IR have advanced definitive critics of 
this “obsession” with the terminology of “survival”, and its transfer to a “societal object”, 
but politicians and journalists are still immune from these critics and continue their 
narratives as if they were not existent (Heisler and Layton-Henry 1993, Buzan 1993, 
Waever 1993).  
To understand how IR has given a so specific and so powerful definition of security 
and has imposed its own definition as “the” definition, it is necessary to look back at the 
link between security, deterrence, and a bipolar world where only a couple of great 
powers have an effective capacity to impose their will of power by the massive retaliations 
they were ready to do, including killing millions of innocent civilians (Brodie 1958, Snyder 
1959) (Snyder 1961). The main discussions of the late 1950s by what international 
relations has called the “realist school” (Edward Hallet Carr, Hans Morgenthau, Raymond 
Aron, Robert Gilpin, Kenneth Waltz, Samuel Huntington) were about the use (or not) of 
nuclear weapons, the possibility of deterrence through a reformulated Clausewitzian 
approach, and an applied form of “game theory” coming from a branch of the sociology of 
organisation and decision, privileging the view of rational choice over beliefs, ideologies, 
and emotions (Griffiths, Roach, and Solomon 2008). This was a struggle that was won 
against behaviourists by a group of scholars and practitioners (often generals) who were 
interested in reassuring people that the nuclear war was not for tomorrow, that reason 
would triumph with the help of deterrence and strategic thinking, negating the idea of a 
successful first strike.  
Security or strategic studies were established to promote stability, order, certainty, 
even the status-quo.  This was a “serious” game of convincing both the enemy and the 
population that the status quo was the best they may get. Raymond Aron coined the 
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situation as “neither war nor peace” and Morgenthau approved (Morgenthau 1967). This 
is why security was also a topic in the debates regarding subversion and counter-
subversion, the development of indirect strategies to by-pass the European theatre and 
the means to counter them, the analysis of small wars and derivative guerrillas of the third 
world as by-products of bipolarity, and the ways to contain or roll back the real agents 
behind the scene (the soviets). But actions of terrorism were considered merely as tactics 
into a strategic game, mafias and organised crime were considered as non-political. 
Stephen Walt was very clear in the 1990, repeating the argument of David Singer of forty 
years before: security is different from law and order. Security is a question for military 
forces, not police forces or justice (Walt 1991). They are at two different levels, and these 
levels do not have the same weight. One can be solved by an increase of force because a 
certain monopoly exists inside of a state to the benefits of a government, but within the 
international realm, nobody has this monopoly, even the most powerful and we live in a 
structural anarchy, which nevertheless is not pure chaos, as diplomatic mechanisms and 
games of alliance block the possibility of an “imperium” by one state.   
 The discussion on security spanning  more than forty years (1950-1990) was 
therefore framed inside a specific context - the Cold War- which was seen as a permanent 
state of the interstate system, both for the present and for the foreseeable future.  Military 
and civil strategists were in strong opposition about the means and some of the goals, but 
they accepted the bipolar framework as evidence of “something” specific called 
‘international security’, which had its own agenda, mechanisms and specialists, ones 
radically different from the problems of “law and order”. Security studies focused on 
strategic studies had been considered at that time as a sub-field of IR without much debate 
coming from other disciplines. It differentiated itself inside IR when the dominance of the 
realist school began to retract to defence, strategy and foreign affairs, while more and 
more IR specialists focused on behaviourism, the world economy, international 
organisations and collaboration between states. The building of a disciplinary boundary 
for external security as the knowledge for survival against danger of war was not so much 
an effect of the situation of nuclear deterrence than an effort of this pessimistic and 
conservative  cynics calling themselves realist to defend the domain of security against 
the liberal internationalists invading international relations on the economic and social 
sides of it. External security was the way to define a new border in order to keep part of 
the IR discipline under their control.  
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Nicolas Guilhot (2008, 2010) has explained very clearly how the retreat from 
dominant positions by the realist school has transformed security into their last 
stronghold in the IR discipline and how they have fought, and still do, to preserve it, and 
to keep this activity under their monopoly. The key move here was to (re)define regularly 
security as “national security”, and national security as the security of the state (as an 
apparatus and as a collectivity of citizens), by emphasising the necessity to consider 
security as a means for peace and order, and as a modality of power in the hands of the 
state. National interest was therefore the driver of national security. But in each period of 
these forty years, national interests were redefined as governmental interests or the 
interests of the alliance of Nato, or the interests of a benign hegemon. National security 
was not really blended with private security, and even less with the safety of the 
individual, but it was functioning analogically in the same way at a different “level” of 
analysis; a more ‘important’ and ‘serious’ one. The boundaries of the “concept” of national 
security were set up as “strong” and “narrow” for good reasons, Stephen Walt claimed 
after the attacks that the end of the cold war has destroyed the claims of strategists to 
have a monopoly on security (Walt 1991).   
Security studies beyond International Relations: expanding 
the agenda and meeting criminologists “en route to the 
global”. 
 
Some “peace researchers” and polemologists have challenged from the seventies 
this assumption that security was the equivalent of an absence of war and conflict by 
illuminating the role of state repression, genocide, and war without a formal declaration 
of war. They insisted also that security needed to begin from the lived experiences of 
human beings and they were insisting that the distinction between international and 
internal conflicts had not taken into consideration the metamorphoses of violence and its 
relation to transnational actors invading the realm of interstate relations (Bigo and 
Hermant 1991, Bigo 1986)(Galtung 1981). But they were a minority existing in the Nordic 
countries and a little bit in France and Belgium. They clearly did not reach the core of the 
US think-tanks that were melting together key politicians, generals, strategists, and civil 
servants, and who wanted to promote the spirit of national defence and security. 
Academia was also at this time rather marginal and the field of strategic studies was 
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populated by multi-positioned individuals who had previously been in charge of politics, 
and were in an academic career, by default (as they were too old or have been sent back 
into the opposition because of political changeover). Nevertheless, as is well known, by 
the turn of the 1990s, the field of security studies had attracted its own critics ( R.B.J 
Walker, 1993; Jutta Weldes, 1999 ; Peoples and Vaughan Williams 2010).  These political 
theorists were not well received. They were considered as ineffective or even subversive 
when they argued that the narratives of necessity, freedom and security, as well as the 
divide between an internal and an external world of the state (transforming it into a Janus 
god), were not in phase with political theorists’ subtle accounts of the problems of 
modernity. Realists were betraying their sources and had not really understood 
Machiavel, Hobbes or even Clausewitz. Some voices from the realist school had already 
anticipated some of the critiques and insisted that the concept of international security 
had to be “enlarged” in order to cope with changes in the wider world, especially after the 
fall of the Berlin wall. Barry Buzan (1983) had already pleaded for an extension of the 
security agenda to political, economic, environmental and societal – rather than just 
military –sectors. He argued that each area had its own form of security, and that in some 
cases the state was not the main actor, but he maintained the unity of the notion of 
security by claiming that all forms of security were related with a specific “existential 
threat” and that survival (of the referent object) was at stake in all cases(Buzan 1983). 
Although the first edition of his book was not really discussed beyond a narrow circle of 
specialists, it became, after the end of bipolarity, a mantra for many security professionals 
who were afraid that the peace dividend narrative was diminishing both their budgets 
and their legitimacy (Bigo 1995; 2002) 
In such a context where the cleavages between the strategists and military 
personnel were almost homologous to the cleavages of the academic field of IR security 
studies; the second edition of the book by Barry Buzan in 1991 became a battlefield for 
an inner struggle between on one side the “classics” regrouping for once the traditional 
military and civilian strategists, plus some retired professionals of politics giving them 
strong voices, and on the other side, the “neo-moderns” who extended the security role to 
any risk management in need of speed and discipline (the so-called quality of the army). 
This extension included all the “small wars” - fighting counter-insurgency and terrorism, 
and “pacifying” so-called ‘failed states’ - and international policing – surveillance of 
international trade routes for drug dealers and organised crime, plus illegal migrants - 
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obliging the military forces to work more with intelligence services, to develop private 
forms of engagement, and, if absolutely necessary, to collaborate with police 
organisations or even with NGOs; the result was a forming of competitive networks of 
transnational guilds associating these diverse experts (Olsson 2009., Bigo and Tsoukala 
2008). 
Even if some networks tied to the “classic” view were not supportive of UN 
international policing, the argument that security ought to be defined in broader terms 
than traditional military confrontations was finally accepted. However, the “neo-
moderns” won more quickly in academia than in politics and the practical security fields.  
Civilian ‘protection’ became a key word to justify intervention against natural 
catastrophes (and the environment) or against warlords and criminals at the head of 
“failed” states, in order to rebuild their “societies” and to introduce freedom. 
‘Responsibility to Protect’ was presented as a peace and protection engagement 
mobilising the idea of a pastoral power that the UN Security Council could lead. This 
“enlargement” of the terms of reference for security created emotional discussions about 
the boundaries of international relations and reactivated the notion of “human” security 
with an agenda to create links between development and security, or more exactly under-
development, fragility and threats to the security of other nations (Kaldor 1999, 2000; 
Newman, this volume). It obliged a further rethink about the relation between “inside” 
and “outside”, of international security and domestic law and order. The Cold War was a 
different epoch, another age, and security could become a positive project globally. But to 
do so, it was necessary to have a grip on the internal formation of societies and to enter 
into the realm of police, urban studies, geography, ethnology and criminology. In some 
ways, part of the strategists who specialised in Kremlinology reinvented themselves as 
ethnographers of the Middle East or Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, it was not a great success, 
as they maintained and applied their strategic views of ‘the enemy’ to phenomena far 
more complex (and often without any clear ‘enemies’). The idea of multiple, 
interconnected threats worked here as a substitute for any identifiable, serious enemy, 
and without the USSR, it became necessary (and useful) to worry about the importance of 
rising crime, the dangerousness of cities, and the “fact” that migrants were more violent 
and more likely to be criminals, with the conclusion that transversal threats were 
permeating states, that identity and ‘otherness’ were at stake, that internal order was 
transformed into internal disorder, and that security had to be globalised in order to stay 
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civilized. In this logic, security was transmuted into a global common good, more 
important than peace or freedom. It was the birth of a “security first” argument (Etzioni 
2007). But the security first argument was recognising the prevalence of internal security, 
vulnerability of infrastructures, of lives of people as key values, reorganising centrally 
security as a form of “protection” of people inside against the very different forms of risks 
and uncertainties that may happen “globally” and “locally”. The image of enmity was 
certainly continuing to be central, but its definition can be fuzzy and moving along time 
very quickly. The uncertainty of the analysis was transferred to the vision of the world 
itself  and the world was therefore chaotic by itself, and uncertainty became a quality of 
strategy, moved into a risk management profile; at the same moment the individualisation 
of life in order to maintain the argument of protection of “each” individual (on one side) 
was put under the label of a “humanitarianism” of security where humanity as the global 
collectivity and humanity as each individual separately were connected together,  
relativizing the centrality of national(state) security. Policing internationally by military 
means was nevertheless an action of policing, not a war. Managing lethal force to the 
minimum became a mantra. External security involutes towards internal security. A 
different series of regime of justification was necessary in order to rebuild external 
security as a logical follow up of internal security, as the continuity of the same 
phenomenon abroad. The separation was forgotten, the interstate was demised, but the 
global as an expanded internal logic where society and the world society are 
synchronised, became central. 
Security as internal security, security as a common global good fighting against 
global crime: the reverse “expansion”. 
 
At the moment where IR was profoundly destabilised by its pretence to be 
scientific and predictive globally and its incapacity to see the structural changes in the 
USSR that geographers, demographers and sociologists has identified many years before, 
and in order to rebuild a new vision of security and war, the IR specialists needed 
unconventional allies that they found in the mainstream of criminology dealing already 
with the so-called transnational organised crime and irregular migrants as sources of 
crime and fear of crime. This encounter between the two disciplines in the 1990s was 
unfortunately based on the false assumption of an objective merging of war and crime 
permitting to the two disciplines to have a direct connection around the criminalisation 
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of war and the transnational organisation of crime. Far from being productive in terms of 
knowledge, the epistemological move to adjust to a new post bipolar reality by 
abandoning the idea of a divide between internal and external security in favour of a the 
idea of a fusion, of a merging of military and police as answers to war and crime, which 
were blending, has created a kind of “doxa”, which had spread over in a geopolitics of 
crime and illegal migration fantasising the millions of individual decisions of travellers as 
if they were the fifth column of groups afar trying to strike a country too easily receiving 
people, refugees, migrants, tourists. Almost twenty years after its emergence, this 
discourse of the fusion of war into crime and of crime into war is still with us.  
Despite precise case studies that have shown both the possibility that in some very 
rare occasions clandestine groups have used the route of smugglers and people fleeing 
their countries, and the false generalisations in terms of statistics coming from these 
examples, the mediatisation in popular press of this mixing of a reasoning of geopolitics 
with polls concerning individual feelings and convictions concerning “others” has in fact 
allowed stereotypes constructed by the alliance of a backward imperialism and a 
criminology inspired by socio biology as well as neuro sciences, to circulate more and 
more freely regarding the migrants as a structural danger, or a potential enemy within.   
Consequently, we have seen the emergence of a strategisation of the everyday via 
the argument of such a merging, following often institutional practices and discourses of 
justification elaborated by politicians who wanted to intervene with military means 
abroad but without engaging into a semantic of war conflict in a UN world prohibiting 
aggression between states.  
The sociology of contemporary security and the analysis of its practices, it is 
contended here, have been much more developed in the sociology of policing, 
criminology, economics, risk management, and in migration studies than in IR. The label 
“internal security”, or alternatively “law and order” and “feelings of insecurity” have 
generated very important strands of research, including a sociology of transnational 
policing and a sociology of transnational organised crime or border migrations. But as we 
have seen they have not been taken into consideration in the narratives of IR specialists, 
which have preferred to present their new justifications as if they have reached a “new 
continent” of security domains and have discovered recently a “societal” security for 
which they are the only ones that can provide a global approach encompassing all forms 
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of security. The “indigenous” researchers of internal security have thus been transformed 
into informers, a situation they did not like and that they still combat nowadays.  
 
The war on terror discourse post 2001 reinforced this post 90s logic and is still a 
powerful argument in terms of counter terrorism against a so-called global jihad and the 
radicalisation of youth over the world via propaganda on internet messages, even if the 
terminology of war on terror has been abandoned. The question of the boundaries 
between internal and external security has been re-opened for a while, but the mind-set 
to see them as two different questions continues for many topics, or moves on the 
opposite direction and creates under the label of global, major intellectual confusions that 
grasp only stereotypes of other disciplines, instead of working in a transdisciplinary 
framework (Bigo 2001b, Loader and Sparks 2002, Aas 2013)(Loader and Percy 2012). 
 
Criminologists have partly resisted this “imperial” move of the IR specialists, but 
in some ways they have agreed to fight for the same stakes: who will have the right to 
settle the boundaries of security, who will become the specialist of both war and crime, of 
these “new wars” that are also forms of crime that can be fought by international policing 
justified by a responsibility to protect? Who will be the voice of the rise of the arguments 
of preventive wars against terrorism? Who will succeed to justify a discourse which is not 
anymore about deterrence and escalation between adversaries, but about the psychology 
of unknown enemies that self-radicalised at home and are often petty criminals?  The 
connection between, on the one side, political discourses on foreigners as unwelcome and, 
on the other side, statistics of crime and prisons - where foreign nationals are supposedly 
represented in a higher number than their percentage in society- has been the bedrock of 
justifications for excusing previous economic policies, especially their failure to sustain 
employment, social benefits and health, while blaming the arrival of foreigners in the 
national soil and the habits of their children. Along the line of different narratives, the idea 
of what a foreigner is, has been reframed in such a way that instead of being the opposite 
of a national citizen, they have been associated with ethnicity and even racism by the 
emergence of a notion of “third countries nationals” (rather than European citizens), 
without this being defined substantially. Foreigners have been divided in many categories 
from legitimate to abnormal, and the connotations associated with migration have been 
set up under the terminology of “immigrants”, of outsiders coming inside and trying to 
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overstay. The move from foreigner to migrant has in turn opened the door for 
connotations regarding the illegality and criminality of foreigners, or at least a certain 
group of them. If it was still outrageous in the seventies to construct such connections, in 
the name of the realism of the ethnicity of foreigners coming from beyond the EU, a strong 
normalisation of the associated language - with the appearance of “migration” studies in 
connection with “criminological” studies - has modified the way crime, (dis)order, 
(il)legality and (in)security have been thought about and assembled (Bigo 2006). Crime 
and migration have thus been forged as a unique problem within the realm of “internal” 
security in many countries, and this 1980’s move has been exploited both nationally and 
for the constitution of a European space of internal or societal security (renamed the ‘area 
of justice and home affairs’ - the terminology of internal security acting too much as a 
reminder of McCarthyism in the English language).  
But this idea of an internal security or “European home affairs” obliges countries 
to cooperate, pushing their Ministries of Justice and Interior to concentrate their efforts 
around the theme of the “protection” of the EU borders, for the sake of an “European 
society”. The criminalisation of migrants, the “crimmigration” of the justice system, and 
the rise of far right rhetoric have been analysed in relation to the set of practices 
converging against foreigners, including the change from ‘law and order’ to ‘internal 
security’ and intelligence-led policing.  
Some authors have insisted that the term security has arrived in criminology in 
relation to a different managerial approach insisting more on preventive measures 
concerning crime, situational analysis, and development of a mapping of urban spaces to 
detect the correlates of crime with specific neighbourhoods. Against the idea of the 
connection of crime with specific societal dimensions such as class, poverty and 
inequality, these criminological security narratives have insisted on “opportunities” and 
“risks” for the potential criminal, and his rational calculus of the profit to be taken from 
the action. The language of “insurance” is saturating the one of security. Simultaneously 
the “private security industry” complex is a subject where geographers, management 
specialists, urban planners, and economists dispute the IR knowledge on this topic. And 
through this line of thought, they have considered that criminologists have for once a 
better grip not only of internal security but also international security, and they tried to 
reverse the move of the specialists of IR to become themselves the “global” experts. 
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For some of them, if one wants to understand the contemporary practices of 
(in)security, it is as important to analyse this transformational move of regrouping under 
internal security the themes of crime, migration, asylum and circulation of persons, as it 
is to decipher the change of strategic studies after the end of the Cold War. It is crucial to 
come back to this period in order to understand the impact that this label of internal 
security had in Germany, Austria, Switzerland and also in France. It has brought together 
a preoccupation in public policy with forms of academic knowledge, which were 
previously quite dispersed. Statisticians, demographers, geographers, urban planners, 
criminologists, psychologists, economists, risk analysers, ethnographers and sociologists 
of minorities have come to work together, not for the sake of knowledge, but to tackle a 
political problem constructed as the risk of riots, internal seditions, and the rise of racism 
by the so-called natives; the “real”-citizens, the one having the state and blood identity 
and the proper behaviours. This so-called re-emergence of the enemy within and its 
subversion of national identities has been seen by the professionals of politics in some 
countries as a threat at least equivalent to the risk of war, and involving a hidden 
geopolitics between states using their diasporas as tools against the “receiving” countries. 
The connection between migration, identity and danger of destabilisation of such a 
“societal” identity of the “nation” or of “Europe” has been pushed forward in many 
political parties, providing different answers, but accepting the frame of the discussion. 
Institutional bodies focused on and concerned with internal security have mushroomed, 
as have grants concerning the research on migrants and diasporas. Even more 
importantly, a “market” of internal security concerning private property, thefts, and 
incivilities has permitted a recycling of knowledge of military or policing activities in the 
work of selling protection under the name of internal security to a certain class of citizen. 
Critical criminology, critical border studies and surveillance studies: the 
mediators needed to understand (in)security today 
 
Against this fusion-acquisition by a series of experts on the geopolitics of global 
crime and their ethnic mafias connected to irregular migrants, who are erasing any form 
of articulated knowledge in order to justify a certain kind of conservative politics related 
to “others” as useful enemies, serious research on global crime has on the contrary tried 
to articulate the analysis coming from international relations and criminology on their 
critical constructivist sides. They challenged the doxa of the prevent-predictive argument 
 page 16 2017-03-20 
 16 
by showing the articulation through which everyday practices are embedded into 
dynamics of fields of power which give authority to some actors to authorise themselves 
in a specific academic discipline, as transversal experts, or as practitioners, to construct -
voluntarily or not- a series of interconnected politics of fear, anxiety and unease. This 
politics made of narratives, post facto justifications, untold practices and even revelations 
of these events years later, is therefore not an objective explanation, but what frames de 
facto the (in)securitization process and its evolutions.  
Therefore, far from believing in a chaotic world in the making justifying more 
“preventive” approaches, they have insisted that prevention in a criminal justice system 
is more dangerous than a coercive approach as the former is based on uncertainty, 
suspicion and important risk against habeas corpus. They have then warned of limiting 
the use of the argument of predictive policing for terrorism though it may work at best 
for repetitive, cyclical forms of crime by large groups that repeat their actions because 
they are quite insensitive to police actions, it does not work for intelligence anticipation 
against forms of irregular and tactical forms of clandestine violence by small groups that 
avoid repetition. They have also criticised those who want to put into a continuum of 
similar practices the questions of narco trafficking, piracy on high sea or along the coasts, 
of trafficking of persons and smuggling of irregular migrants and of help to asylum 
seekers in the name of a merging of war and crime. On the contrary they have shown that 
if a merging exists, it is not in these differentiated practices but in the colonising frames 
of different security institutions who want to be the prime coordinator of “joint 
operations” between military, intelligence, police and border guards and try to use their 
specific professional characteristics as the key element to receive more funds and more 
power into the asymmetric relations of a forced collaboration created often to please the 
argument of prevention and prediction. The (in)security continuum is therefore a move 
that aims to transfer the legitimacy of the fight against a certain type of identified enemy 
against suspected ones, against collateral victims of security operations reframed as 
helping the potential enemy, against minorities identified as potential supporters of 
clandestine actions. It works only if one believes in the eradication of all the boundaries 
of war and crime, and is clearly a fantasy when one has the possibility to show how these 
discourses forget the structural articulations of power and knowledge between the 
professionals of security. This is why we need a critical move against this idea of a chaotic 
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world generating a global social war and justifying the subordination of criminal justice 
to a preventive logic led by intelligence services and their intrusive techniques.   
The politics of unease and fear as a way to govern populations has been criticised 
strongly by a strand of literature coming from the works of critical criminological thinkers 
with Robert Reiner on one side, David Garland, Richard Ericson on the other (Reiner 1993, 
Garland 2001, Ericson 2000). Contrary to the mainstream of international relations 
thinkers that have allied with the criminologists supporting this vision of a global chaotic 
world, they have shown the expansion of national strategies of crime control 
internationally through police collaborations and the fact that these ways to govern crime 
were justified not under the label of law and order but under the label of security. They 
have also insisted on the role of the private into the framing of security as a commodity 
that can be sold and its commercialisation including in terms of expert service providers 
and not only prolongation of the military industry by an industry of surveillance. It has 
profoundly reframed what security does and means because security is dependent on the 
understanding of the hybridisation of public and private bureaucracies and the 
reformulation of what a state apparatus means if it is not any more a purely national, 
territorial apparatus commended by one national political class. The Weberian and 
Westphalian categories of thought organising the idea of security are at stake. 
Consequently it is not an extension of International Relations or even a critical  knowledge 
on security which is needed to analyse these para-private security complex, but a full 
reconfiguration of the relations between these partial disciplinary forms of knowledge 
that we can label (in)security assemblages or (in)security processes whose dynamics are 
organised along the different field of power (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009), (Leander 
2005).  
Taking into account the different research literature on internal security and 
sociology of surveillance (Anderson, Walker, Loader, Sheptycki, Bigo), Lucia Zedner in her 
very short but excellent book, aptly entitled “security”, has explained that if security has 
been considered as the province of international relations, international law and war 
studies, this is not anymore the case: “criminologists talk of ‘governing security’, 
‘governing through security’, ‘selling security’, ‘civilising security’, ‘imagining security’” 
(Zedner 2009: 1)(Ericson and Stehr 2000, Crooke et al. 2004). And she is doing for 
criminologists in an abridged version what Gros and Delumeau (Delumeau 1989, Gros 
2013) have done for history. As she said: “Linguistically, security is a slippery and 
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contested term... The resultant ambiguity about what is promised, provided, sold, or 
sought when security is involved, is a form of licence” (Zedner 2009:10). Playing with the 
notion of “licence”, she shows very convincingly that the deployment of universalist terms 
as security (or sécurité, or sichereit) creates superficial similarities and masks the 
tensions of the varying usages across jurisdictions as well as the work of “translation” 
involved in the circulation of the terminology of security between national and 
professional cultures. This series of oppositions between language and materiality, 
between norms and practices, are irrelevant. Translations are central. Discursive 
practices are material. Language is essential because it is a material activity, which makes 
sense only relationally. In this logic, security is for something and is material including in 
the symbolic or theatrical spectacle of politics it provides. 
 William Walters, Alessandro Dal Lago, and Nicholas de Genova among others have 
developed this notion of a security spectacle that Murray Edelman had initiated around 
the political spectacle (Walters 2002, Dal Lago 2003, De Genova 2013, Edelman 1988). 
Nicholas de Genova has used the notion of border spectacle to show this specific 
connection between symbolic politics, theatrical gesture and the rise of biopolitical 
technology of control as well as digital surveillance. Security at the borders has been one 
of the best sites to reflexively think about the boundaries of security and instead to go on 
a global encompassing and maximal security of the inside and the outside; the discussion 
has shown the limits of security, its incompletude, and its dependence towards the notion 
of freedom. 
As a result of state-borders studies by critical criminologists and geographers, f 
security finally has been partially detached from its previous meanings of international 
security, and concentrated (even precipitated) into the border practices and the 
mechanisms of control and surveillance. The discussion of the relations between security 
and freedom, security and equality, security and justice, security and democracy, have 
been on the other side relaxed, as if security was not anymore propelling inequality in 
everyday routines of work and consumption, suspicion in anticipative logics of 
punishment before trial, surveillance in apparent logics of freedom of movement, 
limitations of the space of possible options in a democratic public debate (Wood and 
Dupont 2006, Ranciere and Heron 1995, Wood and Shearing 2007). As a result, most of 
the discussion in legal theory has been framed regarding the relation between security 
and data protection-privacy or between security and cases of torture as well as the 
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gravest violations of human rights, but not much about all the gradients where security, 
far from balancing freedom to find a new equilibrium regarding danger, is reframing the 
very notion of freedom by fragmenting its meanings and by wearing some of its clothes 
(Bigo et al. 2010).  
The fact that security may have an effect on the shores of democratic politics has been 
further discussed by some of the French political theorists (Ranciere 2006, Balibar 2004) 
and  has acheived an important success in challenging the discourse of a global security 
running preventively, but it has also often been accepted too quickly as the very 
transversal definition of an act of security that has no border any more, and is always in 
“excess” (Butler 2002). But this may be also a problem in following this last line of enquiry, 
which puts too much emphasis on performative language, and insists too little on the 
socio-history of the fields of power and of their variations in time, or is too inattentive to 
the diverse translations of security between different universes of practices ; for example 
health and security (Howell 2011). Changing words, changing language via academic 
performativity is not a solution and a form of possible desecuritisation. The lived 
experiences makes sense into the fields of forces and power in which they are inserted. 
They are what inform the “assemblages” of (in)security. 
 
Thinking in transdisciplinary terms to understand (in)security experiences 
and their different scripts. 
 
To proceed to the decolonisation of security means to change focus and to refuse 
both the disciplinary distinctions between International Relations (IR), dealing with 
external security, and criminology, dealing with crime and internal security, as well as the 
globalist approach erasing all the boundaries between the different forms of knowledge 
in order to superimpose a political and often conservative argument of a chaotic world. It 
requires us to think about the processes of (in)securitisation, which affect the world as 
transversal practices that have different dynamics, different lengths (in terms of their 
chain of interdependencies), and different implications for places and the people living 
there.  
All security claims, even the most benign, imply a struggle around the legitimacy 
of some ambiguous practices involving violence or control of an actor’s behaviour. 
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Certainly, many practices, which we call security or protection in everyday life, are not, as 
such, an object of direct contestation. Often these practices are seen as forms of freedom. 
For instance, in my home country it seems that I can choose what to eat, drink, wear, as 
well as where I want to go, or what I publish on the internet about myself. But these 
practices can become a security issue when they reach the boundaries of somebody else’s 
freedom, for example because of scarcity, lack of equality and redistribution, forms of 
property, beliefs in primordial identities. Why? Because the temptation is to refuse to 
change the previous practices when they are contested, and to continue by claiming that 
they are vital to assure security, that they are a legitimate reaction versus a danger, a risk, 
a threat, and are de facto justified. The claim may also be used to mobilise support in 
favour of previous actions, which themselves were considered illegitimate. This logic 
operates at the personal level, but also with regard to collectivities and their identities. 
Politicization and creation of social movements which contend power comes often from 
the initial disputes about the boundaries of security that diminish forms of freedom, and 
do not diminish at all insecurities, but on the contrary develop them by escalating the 
violence or by creating the image of a perpetual emergency. 
As explained by Adam Crawford and Steven Hutchinson in their article in this issue 
mapping the contours of everyday security is a central task to avoid the strategisation of 
the everyday by being careful to keep the agency of each actor instead of generalising too 
fast, and this is why this critical criminological approach which insists on the 
anthropological dimension and precise ethnographies meets the Paris school of 
International Political Sociology. Both consider that the struggles for the definition of 
what (in)security is or is not is important for the professionals of security and the 
academics who analyse logic of controls, but the questions about how security is 
understood, articulated and experience is even more central, as the forms of resistance 
or/and autonomy that the actors-targets-victims of an (in)securitisation process engage 
with are not just answers to the logics of control and the assemblages they organise, they 
have also their own logics and specific political imagination, which often destabilise the 
so-called preventive technologies of security. These resistances are not only the rare cases 
of citizen right claims and the public events where they contest their status of illegal, they 
are also inscribed in the ways the logics of escaping are configurating new life styles, a 
way to live for many years in “limbos”, the capacity to become “undetectable” or to blur 
their many quasi-statuses when they are illegal but not expellable for example.  They 
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invent a life style. Their lived experience is not one of a permanent victim, against a certain 
Agambenian vision of their situation, and they are not either the new revolutionaries of 
the world.They are caught in the subjectification of their lives, with their joys, their 
difficulties, but also this politics of the everyday, which is a form of hidden transcript that 
they oppose to both the security professionals and most of the academics reducing them 
to a specific status of criminals, victims, or heroes.  
The lived experiences of the agents in all its complexity is therefore the central goal of the 
script that an international political sociology has to elaborate, and that is why the 
everyday life is so important for this approach, but the everyday experience cannot be 
conceived under a methodological individualism that considers the individual as the only 
engine of its combination of reason and emotions, as this position disregards the objective 
relations of distinction and mimesis that structure de facto the so-called free will or 
spontaneous performativity of the actor.  Consequently the international political 
sociology approach entails the privileging of, against an individualistic approach opposing 
the individual to society, a relational process in which individuals are always dividuals, 
positioning themselves in relation to others, in a society characterised by a chain of 
interdependences always in transformation (Elias and Schroeter 2001). The social has 
therefore to be simultaneously analysed as a heritage, a patrimony of dispositions, but 
also as a fragile present always in the making and never certain. Critical and pragmatist 
sociology can be combined in a coherent way, as it is explained by Luc Boltanski 
(Boltanski 2009). 
In conclusion, from the margins of both IR and criminological studies came a 
powerful counter-discourse challenging the hegemonic approach of so many institutions. 
Against a very common functionalist approach that both criminology and IR share, we 
have to realise that far from being an “answer”, a “freedom from” fear and violence, the 
field of professionals of security produces through the competitions of the multiple actors, 
a way to frame the difference of legitimacy between legitimate and illegitimate violence 
and defines also what is (in)security, what is protection and what is fate. Many 
researchers engaged into the analysis of how institutions think and act, now have the 
possibility to work on more reflexive grounds and to propose different alternatives, 
avoiding the reductionism which destroys the articulation of police and military practices 
by analysing them as an answer to a fusion of war and crime, and a proposal to merge 
criminology and IR into a new discipline analysing radicalisation, illegal migration 
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through the lenses of a geopolitics of the everyday. This supposes, as we have seen, first 
to deconstruct this common sense under which security and insecurity are international 
questions reserved to political scientists specialised on International relations and to 
bring to the fore a conversation about what contemporary (in)security is. Second, it is 
important to recognise that criminologists, sociologists of policing and minorities, have as 
much to say on this topic as IR specialists, but that they have to do so, by knowing the 
contemporary trends of International Relations instead of relying on old forms of 
knowledge repeating a mainstream in rapid extinction. And this article has tried in some 
ways to give a form of decryption of what is at stake in IR for criminologists that often rely 
only on the mainstream narrative and their self-justifications. Third, it is crucial also for a 
future research agenda to see how such a transdisciplinary framework can emerge from 
the in-depth discussion between what had been called critical criminology on one side 
and critical security studies on the other side, especially when both strands of research 
are more and more interested about the practices of the individuals and their lived 
experiences and this is why I invite readers to know more about what has been called a 
PARIS problematisation, which insists on the Mobius strip of international and internal 
security that looks like two faces of the same continuum of practices while they are in fact 
the very same dimension whose topology creates intellectual controversies about 
boundaries and limits of phenomenon; limits that are not dependent from an objective 
truth of the “real” world, but from intersubjective forms of inversion of boundaries that 
nobody want to recognise as it endangers the primary assumption of security: i.e. to be an 
answer to violence. The walk of the researcher along the strip of the Mobius topology is 
therefore a way to understand this half twist joining the ends of the strip to form a loop 
which has only one side and one boundary made by the inner struggles of the actors that 
frame a so-called outside of violence shaping and reshaping their identities, and not at all 
by an answer to what they say they are struggling against (Bigo 2001a, Bigo and Walker 
2007). 
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